Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 3

6-27-2016

Fair Use’s Unfinished Business
Rebecca Tushnet
Georgetown Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rebecca Tushnet, Fair Use’s Unfinished Business, 15 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 399 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol15/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

3 TUSHNET - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/17/16 9:37 AM

FAIR USE’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS
REBECCA TUSHNET*
It’s an honor and a pleasure to have the chance to say a few words about
Judge M. Margaret McKeown’s Censorship in the Guise of Authorship:
Harmonizing Copyright and the First Amendment.1 In the past, I’ve written
extensively about my preferred view of the general relationship between
copyright and the First Amendment.2 Here, I will confine myself to a few
variations on Judge McKeown’s important themes.
I. OVERBROAD COPYRIGHT CLAIMS AND THE ENHANCED DAMAGE OF
OVERBROAD DMCA CLAIMS
First, Judge McKeown is absolutely right to emphasize that overbroad
copyright claims asserted to stifle free speech continue to be a significant
problem.3 Although Garcia v. Google, Inc. presented unusual facts, I think
that the trouble goes deeper than Judge McKeown acknowledges. Ordinary
theories of copyright have been used to suppress political speech ranging
from a successful suit against an unauthorized translation of Hitler’s Mein
Kampf designed to awaken Americans to the threat posed by Nazi ideology4
to less weighty, but still notably successful, lawsuits against political uses of
music inconsistent with composers’ beliefs.5
Overbroad takedown notices under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”) add to the trouble, proving a cheap quasi-injunction that
doesn’t even require the claimant to go to court to take a work out of public
* Professor, Georgetown Law.
1. Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright
and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2016).
2. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common
with Campaign Finance Reform, Hate Speech and Pornography Regulation, and Telecommunications
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000).
3. McKeown, supra note 1, at 2; see, e.g., Katz v. Google, 802 F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 2015)
(finding use of photo to criticize subject of photo was fair use); Galvin v. Illinois Republican Party, No.
14 C 10490, 2015 WL 5304625, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2015) (holding use of photograph to make
political point was fair use); Dhillon v. Does 1–10, No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 WL 722592, at *1, *6 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (same).
4. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Publ’g Co., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
5. See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Browne v. McCain,
612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
399
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circulation.6 Paul Siemienski, WordPress’s general counsel, testified
recently that due to the effectiveness of DMCA takedowns, abuses of the
process are increasing.7 Google’s Transparency Report reveals numerous
examples addressed to Google, but most intermediaries do not make
transparency reports available, and thus the full scope of the problem is
unknown.8 An analysis of fifty million takedown notices submitted to
Google determined that, at a lower bound using the most forgiving measures,
8.3% had serious technical errors, and an additional 1.3% had serious
substantive errors that could have been prevented at little or no cost to
senders.9 These percentages represent nearly five million erroneous
notices.10 Many of the worst offenders were repeat players in Google’s
Trusted Sender program.11
Another recent, random sample of takedown notices, taken from a set
of over 108 million requests submitted to the Lumen archive over a sixmonth period, reached similar conclusions:
Nearly 30% of takedown requests were of questionable validity. In one
in twenty-five cases, targeted content did not match the identified infringed
work, suggesting that 4.5 million requests in the entire six-month data set
were fundamentally flawed. Another 15% of the requests raised questions
about whether they had sufficiently identified the allegedly infringed work
of the allegedly infringing material. The analysis further identified
significant questions related to the availability of potential fair use defense,
complaints grounded on improper (non-copyright) claims, and requests sent
to defunct web sites.12

6. McKeown, supra note 1; see, e.g., Susan Park, Unauthorized Televised Debate Footage in
Political Campaign Advertising: Fair Use and the DMCA, 32 SOUTHERN L.J. 29, 30–38 (2013) (offering
examples at the national and local levels); Campaign Takedown Troubles: How Meritless Copyright
Claims Threaten Online Political Speech, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 2010),
https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/copyright_takedowns.pdf (offering further examples).
7. Hearing on Section 512 of Title 17: No. 113-86 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Internet, 113th Cong., 3, (2014) (testimony of Paul Sieminski),
http://judiciary.house.gov/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=B343EABE-0BF1-44E9-8C85-B3478892B8E1.
8. Google
Transparency
Report,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#abusive_copyright_requests (last
visited Apr. 11, 2016).
9. Daniel Seng, “Who Watches the Watchmen?”: An Empirical Analysis of Errors in DMCA
Takedown Notices, 32, 45 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2563202.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and Takedown in Everyday
Practice, 2 (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628.
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Disturbingly, “one in fourteen (7.3%) of takedown requests raised
questions of potential fair use defenses,”13 mostly having to do with remixes
and other potentially transformative works.14
Unfortunately, reckless takedown notices occur in all sorts of
circumstances. Even in 2015, content owners are taking down uses they have
themselves authorized.15 In other cases, content owners send takedown
notices based on fragmentary phrases or common words that happen to
match the titles of their—and many other—works.16 Overbroad matching
algorithms lead copyright owners to send takedown notices targeting mere
reporting on their works, and even to demand takedowns of links to their
own websites.17 Notice filers may make preposterous claims, reasoning that
intermediaries have little incentive to risk their § 512 protection by
scrutinizing them carefully and that individual users are unlikely to

13. Id. at 12.
14. Id. at 95.
15. See, e.g., Jordan Pearson, NBC’s Bogus Copyright Claim Got Canada’s ‘Mr. Robot’ Premiere
Yanked from Google, VICE, Sept. 4, 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/nbcs-bogus-copyrightclaim-got-canadas-mr-robot-premiere-yanked-from-google; Adam Rosenberg, ‘Pixels’ Copyright
Notices
Took
Down
the
Studio’s
Own
Trailer,
MASHABLE,
Aug.
9,
2015,
http://mashable.com/2015/08/09/pixelsdmca/?utm_cid=mashcomfbmainlink 1/2; Clicky Steve,
Automated DMCA Fail: When Bots Go Bad, TRANSPARENCY REPORT, April 9, 2015,
http://transparency.automattic.com/201 5/04/09/Automated-Dmca-Fail-When-Botsgo-Bad/ (discussing
widely used rights enforcement agency Attributor.com’s takedown of copyright owner’s own website);
see also Annalee Newitz, How Copyright Enforcement Robots Killed the Hugo Awards, IO9, Sept. 3,
2012, http://io9.com/5940036/how-copyright-enforcementrobots-killed-the-hugo-awards (discussing
automated takedown of licensed footage that suppressed a larger broadcast).
16. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, A Glimpse of the Future Under SOPA: Warner Bros. Admits It Filed
Many
False
Takedown
Notices,
TECHDIRT,
Nov.
10,
2011,
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111110/10135116708/glimpse-future-under-sopa-warner-brosadmits-it-filed-many-false-takedown-notices.shtml.
17. See, e.g., Emil Protalinski, Why Automated DMCA Takedown Requests Are Asinine: HBO Asked
Google
to
Censor
Links
to
HBO.com,
THE NEXT WEB,
Feb.
13,
3013,
http://thenextweb.com/media/2013/02/03/why-automated-dmca-takedown-requests-are-asinine-hboasked-google-to-censor-links-to-hbo-com/#!zrspT (HBO provided takedown notices about 8 HBO links,
as well as links to pages on Perez Hilton’s blog, Pinterest, MTV.com, and IGN.com that carried stories
about
the
HBO
content
at
issue);
GOOGLE
TRANSPARENCY
REPORT,
FAQ,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/faq/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014);
GOOGLE
TRANSPARENCY
REPORT,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#abusive_copyright_requests (last
visited Apr. 11, 2016) (“A major U.S. motion picture studio requested removal of the IMDb page for a
movie released by the studio, as well as the official trailer posted on a major authorized online media
service. A U.S. reporting organization working on behalf of a major movie studio requested removal of
a movie review on a major newspaper website twice.”); Emil Protalinski, Microsoft Accidentally Asked
Google to Censor BBC, CBS, CNN, Wikipedia, and Even the US Government, THE NEXT WEB, Oct. 7,
2012, http://thenextweb.com/microsoft/2012/10/07/microsoft-accidentally-asked-google-to-censor-bbccbs-cnn-wikipedia-and-even-the-us-government/#!zrtZO (similar); Emil Protalinski, Automated DMCA
Takedown Requests Are Awful: Microsoft Asked Google to Delete Bing Links, and It Did, THE NEXT
WEB, Oct. 8, 2102, http://thenextweb.com/microsoft/2012/10/08/automated-dmca-takedown-requestsare-awful-microsoft-asked-google-to-delete-bing-links-and-it-did/#!zrt0o (similar).
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counternotify.18 For example, a physician claiming a copyright in his
signature sent a takedown notice for a document related to the suspension of
his license to practice medicine.19 Businesses also submit improper
takedowns in order to suppress discussion of their products or those of their
competitors.20
Still other takedowns are motivated by politics, not copyright interests.
For example, critics of the Argentinian and Ecuadorian governments have
received DMCA takedown notices, and so have reporters on the controversy
over the takedowns.21 WordPress alone has documented numerous instances
of politically motivated takedowns.22 A parody using a video game was
recently taken down after Donald Trump’s campaign retweeted it.23
The problem of politically motivated takedowns worsens during
campaign seasons, when takedown requests can suppress the most effective
and cheapest means of communicating political messages, because the
DMCA counternotification process requires a delay of at least ten business
days before the counternotification becomes effective and the challenged
material is restored.24 Unless an intermediary is willing to forego the
18. See, e.g., Timothy Geigner, Tumblr Complies With DMCA Takedown Requests From A SelfProclaimed
Future-Alien
From
Another
Planet,
TECHDIRT
(Jun.
23,
2015),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150618/14264131389/tumblr-complies-with-dmca-takedownrequests-self-proclaimed-future-alien-another-planet.shtml (discussing successful takedowns filed by
human purportedly acting on behalf of an alien from the future); see also Rob Pegoraro, Trying to Ban
Links to Software Is the DMCA Joke That Never Gets Old, PROJECT-DISCO.ORG, July 19, 2013,
http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/071913-trying-to-ban-links-to-software-is-the-dmcajoke-that-never-gets-old (discussing takedowns directed at software disliked by content providers).
19. Hearing on Section 512 of Title 17: No. 113-86 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Internet, 113th Cong., 5, (2014) (testimony of Katherine Oyama),
http://judiciary.house.gov/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=BE93D452-945A-4FFF-83EC-B3F51DE782B3.
20. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also
Paul Alan Levy, A Bogus DMCA Takedown from Apple, CONSUMER LAW & POLICY BLOG, Nov. 21,
2013,
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2013/11/a-bogus-dmca-takedown-from-apple.html;
Matt
Schruers, Observations on DMCA Reform and Notice & Takedown Abuse, PROJECT-DISCO.ORG, May
23, 2013, http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/052313observations-on-dmca-reform-andnotice-takedown-abuse/ (“Academic research published some years ago using a limited dataset found that
‘over half—57%—of [DMCA takedown] notices sent to Google to demand removal of links in the index
were sent by businesses targeting apparent competitors.’”).
21. Adam Steinbaugh, Ares Rights Adopts Matroyshka Doll Approach to Censorious DMCA
Takedown Notices, ADAM STEINBAUGH’S BLOG ABOUT LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 2, 2014,
http://adamsteinbaugh.com/2014/09/02/ares-rights-adopts-matroyshka-doll-approach-to-censoriousdmca-takedown-notices/.
22. Paul Sieminski, Striking Back Against Censorship, WORDPRESS, Nov. 21, 2013,
http://en.blog.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/striking-back-against-censorship/.
23. Mass
Effect
political
video
taken
down
after
Trump
retweeted
it,
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160405/05560634102/ea-dmcas-trump-mass-effect-mashup-videoclaiming-trump-re-tweeting-it-made-use-political.shtml.
24. Schruers, supra note 20; see, e.g., Campaign Takedown Troubles: How Meritless Copyright
Claims Threaten Online Political Speech, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 2010,
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/copyright_takedowns.pdf (documenting overly aggressive copyright

3 TUSHNET - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

FAIR USE’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS

6/17/16 9:37 AM

403

protections of the DMCA against secondary liability—and most are not—a
fair use can therefore be suppressed at the time of its greatest importance.
Radio personality Michael Savage was thus able to suppress material
criticizing his statements about Muslims, and cripple the critic’s planned
media blitz, including expensive ads in The New York Times that provided
links to the DMCA-suppressed video—or would have, except that audiences
could see nothing but the notice that a takedown had occurred if they
followed the links.25
The DMCA’s inflexibility about the time a takedown must stay in effect
means that fair use can’t serve its crucial, First Amendment-protective
function when it comes to political speech. As the Supreme Court explained
in a different context,
It is well known that the public begins to concentrate on elections only
in the weeks immediately before they are held. There are short timeframes
in which speech can have influence. The need or relevance of the speech will
often first be apparent at this stage in the campaign. The decision to speak is
made in the heat of political campaigns, when speakers react to messages
conveyed by others. A speaker’s ability to engage in political speech that
could have a chance of persuading voters is stifled if the speaker must first
commence a protracted lawsuit.26
The problem of political misuses of the DMCA is likely to increase in
the future given the importance of remix relying on existing footage, usually
without authorization, in political campaigns. A study of remix found that
political videos that became hits were often from nontraditional political
actors.27 Typical party-sponsored political messages got 55,000 views, while
citizen-designed political messages averaged 807,000 views.28 Ads created
by other entities, “mostly media companies, small news organizations,
groups of bloggers, or small video production groups),” averaged over 2.5
million views; of the most viral videos, “only a fifth of them were produced
by the campaigners, and in all cases they were not typical ads, but edited
footage.”29
The required takedown period of at least ten business days is not the
only harm inflicted by misguided DMCA notices. Recipients of misguided

claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that inappropriately stifle political speech on the
Internet).
25. See John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245 (2015).
26. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010).
27. LIMOR SHIFMAN, MEMES IN DIGITAL CULTURE 125 (2014).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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notices often can’t afford to fight back or don’t know they can fight back.
They may mistrust the ways that the notice-sender might use the personal
information that a counternotification requires; this is especially true with
improper takedowns of politically or culturally critical fair uses.30
Separately, most takedowns target search engines under § 512(d), and there
is no obvious way to provide the original sources with any notice. Even if
the targeted speakers somehow learn that their content has been de-indexed,
there is no obvious way for them to counternotify, since § 512 does not
require a counternotification process for link removals under § 512(d).31
As a result, along with defending the substance of fair use, courts must
also police the misuse of DMCA notices. Given persistent principal-agent
problems in takedown practice, where copyright owners delegate
enforcement to entities with little interest in accuracy, the law must provide
incentives for greater care.32 As Daniel Seng concludes in his empirical
study of takedown notices, if it costs next to nothing for a reporter to fire off
a million notices to take down an infringing work, it will fire off a million
notices to do so, regardless of accuracy or precision, as it improves its
chances of succeeding in the takedown. And it can do so with impunity,
because it is largely protected from any collateral damage which it may
cause.33 Section 512(f) of the DMCA provides for liability for senders of bad
faith takedowns, but its use has been relatively limited until recently. As the
Ninth Circuit properly held in 2015, failure to consider fair use before
sending a takedown can provide the requisite bad faith.34 However, much
remains to be worked out before § 512(f) provides a real deterrent to abusive
takedowns.
II. THE PROPER FUNCTION OF COPYRIGHT
Relatedly, Judge McKeown argues that anti-criticism and privacyprotection uses of copyright are generally inconsistent with copyright’s
fundamental purpose.35 Copyright’s goal is not simply to maximize utility.
That would be a tall order for any law. Instead, copyright tries to maximize

30. See Sieminski, supra note 22 (“This tradeoff doesn’t work for the many anonymous bloggers
that we host on WordPress.com, who speak out on sensitive issues like corporate or government
corruption.”).
31. See generally, Seng, supra note 10 (noting that this absence of procedural protection contributes
to the infrequency of counternotices).
32. Id. at 35–36.
33. Id. at 36–37, 48.
34. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2015).
35. McKeown, supra note 1, at 2.
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something else, but what exactly that is—authorship, expression, or
economically incentivized expression—remains less than perfectly defined.
Judge McKeown’s useful distinction between harm and copyright harm is
another way of framing the question of copyright’s purpose.36 If not all harm
caused by unauthorized uses of copyrighted works is copyright harm, then
copyright must have a distinguishing function. If copyright does not have a
distinctive purpose, by contrast, then it is a right that can be asserted for any
reason and used as spackle to fill gaps that may exist in other legal regimes.
We should easily be able to conclude that, if an unauthorized copy was
also defamatory, the harm wrought by the defamation should not count as
harm for purposes of weighing against fair use. The Supreme Court has also
indicated that harm to an author caused by criticism or mockery, though real,
is not the kind of harm copyright guards against.37
But what about privacy? I agree with Judge McKeown that copyright
should not be used to substitute for true privacy protection—for example,
against “revenge porn,” whose harms differ substantially from those of
ordinary copyright infringement.38 However, copyright has been linked with
privacy in various ways, including by Brandeis and Holmes in their famous
article defending the creation of a general right to privacy. They interpreted
common-law copyright in unpublished works as a privacy protection
measure.39 The Supreme Court has similarly endorsed a privacy-like
rationale in copyright cases, referring to an author’s right not to speak.40
However, it is important to understand the limits of this rationale, even on
its own merits. To the extent that copyright protects an author’s choice not
to speak because a work isn’t ready, or intended for public view, that
protection goes to the author’s interest as an author. In other words, the
interest ought to be understood as one relating to the expression contributed
by the author as a creator, not to anything factual in the work. Facts are not
protected by copyright. Likewise, any interests of the subject of the work as
the person about whom the work communicates are not copyright interests,
though they may well be important personhood interests. Their protection
must lie in the law of defamation and privacy, rather than in copyright.

36.
37.
38.
(2014).
39.
(1890).
40.

Id. at 11.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994).
See Rebecca Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346, 2352
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 200–01
E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559–60 (1985).
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This distinction between potential authorial privacy interests and
factual/subject privacy interests helps explain which privacy interests are
clearly inappropriate considerations in fair use cases. Howard Hughes, for
example, failed to suppress a biography by buying up the copyrights in
articles used in that biography; his interest was not truly an author/owner’s
interest, but merely a subject’s.41 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recently
found fair use of a photograph whose subject had bought the copyright in the
photo in order to sue one of his critics.42 Identifying the target of criticism
served as transformative fair use of the photo; the harm that the
subject/copyright owner might suffer was perhaps dignitary, but it wasn’t
related to anything about his authorship or ownership. So too in Garcia, as
Judge McKeown explains, the harm to Garcia flowed not from her interests
as author and performer, but from the unprotectable fact of her (fraudulently
induced) participation in Innocence of Muslims.43 There was no match
between the threats she received as a result of her participation and her
substantive copyright claim.
Due to this distinction between harm and copyright harm, I must
respectfully disagree with Judge McKeown that the decision in Monge v.
Maya Magazines, Inc.,44 which she also authored, is distinguishable from
Garcia in terms of the harm involved.45 In Monge, two musicians sued a
magazine for copyright infringement for printing photos of their secret Las
Vegas wedding. They had not intended to distribute the photos, which
confirmed the existence of their marriage.46 But where was the harm to the
copyright owner’s interest as an author in the dissemination of these photos,
as opposed to the subjects’ privacy interests as subjects? Judge McKeown
relied on the overstatement in the 1984 case of Harper & Row that “every
commercial use is presumptively an unfair exploitation,”47 even though this
statement was explicitly repudiated by the Supreme Court in the 1994 case
of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. In Campbell, the Supreme Court made clear that

41. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1966).
42. Katz v. Chevaldina, No. 14-14525, slip op. at 11 (11th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015).
43. McKeown, supra note 1, at 5–8.
44. 688 F.3d 1164 (2012).
45. McKeown, supra note 1, at 9.
46. Monge, 688 F.3d at 1169.
47. Id. at 1176; McKeown, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984))). But see Monge, 688 F.3d at 1172 (acknowledging, before applying the fair use factors,
that this statement was not good law).
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most fair uses would be commercial, and that transformativeness rather than
commerciality was the touchstone of fair use.48
The always thoughtful Professor Jane Ginsburg has cautioned against
limiting the concept of harm in copyright cases:
If a showing of harm is to become an element of many or most
infringement claims, whether directly through copyright reform, or through
the expanding back door of fair use, then it will be important for courts to
develop a capacious understanding of what “harm” means. If the
unauthorized use in itself no longer establishes the harm, so that the violation
is not mere trespass to a property right, but something more, then the
additional element must account comprehensively both for economic and
noneconomic harm to authors and rightowners.49
Ginsburg is reacting to proposals that harm should become a more
important part of infringement cases, especially in evaluating fair use
defenses.50
She is concerned about preserving new and currently
undeveloped markets for authors, as well as non-pecuniary interests tied to
an author’s “vision” of her work and the “integrity” of her creation. “The
fundamental purpose of copyright is to foster an environment of respect—
both material and moral—for authorship conducive to creative endeavors.”51
I disagree that many such non-pecuniary interests deserve protection by
copyright law, at least with respect to published works. In a free speech
culture as robust as the United States’, where insults to dignity are generally
nonactionable in the absence of defamation, authors should have to slug it
out with the rest of us, as unpleasant as that may be. However, even if
Ginsburg is correct, her emphasis on non-pecuniary interests of the author
as author may still exclude many of the interests Judge McKeown and I
agree ought to be off-limits.
Ginsburg’s argument also raises the question of whether copyright is
“property.” She would like to see it treated as such, analogizing to trespass
to land, where any invasion is actionable even absent a showing of harm.
But trespass to land isn’t the only way property can be governed. Trespass
to chattels generally requires harm to be actionable. Nuisance law requires
harm and a balancing of the equities; real property protected by nuisance
48. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
49. Jane Ginsburg, Copyright: No Longer a Property Right?, MEDIA INSTITUTE, Nov. 24, 2015,
http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2015/112415.php (footnote omitted).
50. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1175, 1188 (2010) (recommending “that copyright owners be required to prove
commercial harm when they make claims of infringement other than those involving exact or nearexact
copies that operate in the same market as the allegedly infringed work”).
51. Ginsburg, supra note 49.
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rules is still property.52 And even land protected by a trespass rule requires
us to know the boundaries of the land to be protected—the “boundaries” of
a copyrighted work are often very much up for debate. The label “property,”
in fact, answers very few of the questions that we might care about in
copyright, such as whether Garcia ought to have a cause of action against
Google.
And this leads to a related point Judge McKeown makes about fair use
as a First Amendment bulwark.53 In one view, fair use constrains the scope,
or limits the boundaries, of copyright rights so that they don’t unduly
interfere with others’ rights to speak freely. As Judge McKeown notes, fair
use can be fairly uncertain, which doesn’t seem all that consistent with First
Amendment demands for certainty. But then again, if you closely examine
other First Amendment areas, such as public forum doctrine or obscenity,
they aren’t all that certain either. Moreover, fair use has in fact developed
over time to be broadly predictable. Scholars have identified categories of
fair uses that provide reasonable certainty, and professional bodies have
adopted best practices in fair use to guide practitioners in fields ranging from
education to filmmaking to choreography; and insurers now accept fair use
determinations in documentary filmmaking, indicating that fair use is
serving as a good-enough protection in many circumstances.
Judge McKeown also repeats Christopher Eisgruber’s claim that
copyright isn’t censorious, because it doesn’t involve content discrimination
by the government.54 One reason government doesn’t bring copyright cases
is that the federal government is excluded from owning its own works by the
Copyright Act, an exclusion that itself serves free speech goals.55 In other
countries, where governments do have copyright in government works,
government censorship is possible.56 Moreover, there is currently a battle
over whether state and local codes that govern everyday life can be locked
behind paywalls, so that ordinary citizens are not necessarily free to see and

52. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652,
682 (2010).
53. McKeown, supra note 1, at 6.
54. Id. at 4 (quoting Christopher L. Eisgruber, Censorship, Copyright, and Free Speech: Some
Tentative Skepticism About the Campaign to Impose First Amendment Restrictions on Copyright Law, 2
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 17, 18 (2003)).
55. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, STELLA W. & IRA S. LILLICK, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.5.2, 87–98 (1989).
56. See David Fewer, Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of
Copyright in Canada, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 175, 197 (1997) (discussing the use of copyright by
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom to suppress publication of government documents).
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use them without paying.57 But more importantly, every copyright case
involves the government in deciding whether speech ought to be suppressed,
and the First Amendment is therefore implicated, even without a government
plaintiff. Defamation cases weren’t brought by the government as such, and
New York Times v. Sullivan is still a foundational First Amendment case.58
Courts can be sensitive to First Amendment considerations while still
recognizing that the economic incentive provided by copyright rights can
regularly be enough to justify sanctions against pure, substitutionary copies.
This brings us back to the question of the purpose of copyright: when it’s
limited to providing incentives for economically-motivated expression, and
when fair use is sufficiently robust, the First Amendment is satisfied.
III. OTHER LESSONS FROM GARCIA V. GOOGLE
Judge McKeown also wrote the opinion for the en banc Ninth Circuit
in Garcia v. Google,59 and uses that as a jumping-off point for her incisive
observations on the use of copyright law to obtain non-copyright objectives.
Another lesson that might be taken away from Garcia, however, is that
American copyright law hesitates to threaten large corporations. Authorship
in individual performers who didn’t sign ironclad contracts—especially
when paired with the DMCA’s ability to create immediate quasi-injunctive
relief through takedown notices sent, for example, to Comcast or Netflix—
would have created profound industry uncertainty. The Second Circuit was
equally explicit about those risks when it ruled, similarly to the ultimate
result in Garcia, that performers did not have separate copyright rights in
performances in motion pictures.60 This concern for copyright owners over
personal or individual interests is a consequence of the laser focus of
American copyright law on economic interests, and not, I think, an
unintended one.
Judge McKeown notes that Garcia’s claim might well have come out
differently in Europe, and that the considerations would also have been
different if she brought a non-copyright claim such as false light.61 She notes
the “[p]orous and [i]mperfect [p]rivacy [p]rotections in the United States,”62

57. See American Society for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 534
(D.D.C. 2015).
58. 376 U.S. 254, 305 (1964) (establishing strict First Amendment constraints on defamation claims
by public figures).
59. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
60. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 2015).
61. McKeown, supra note 1, at 8.
62. Id. at 14.
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but the real issue for Garcia was intermediary liability, rather than direct
liability. Even a comprehensive privacy law covering the filmmaker’s acts
towards Garcia would not have changed the outcome in Garcia. Indeed,
Garcia already had a number of claims against the filmmaker that seem
indisputably valid. However, Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act provides blanket immunity for intermediaries like YouTube for nonintellectual property claims.63 Section 230 has a huge channeling effect in
the U.S., driving plaintiffs to seek ways to define their problems as
intellectual property claims.
Garcia could also have tried a false endorsement claim, arguing that her
presence in the altered film implied her endorsement of the views expressed
therein. Absent the strong First Amendment protection that has developed
for traditional forms of media, she could probably at least state a claim. Had
she appeared in a video game instead of a short film, she might even have
prevailed on a right of publicity claim.64 These considerations make clear
that, to the extent that we are interested in the First Amendment implications
of suppressing Innocence of Muslims or other works, we need to ensure that
other causes of action are also limited by First Amendment considerations,
as defamation and privacy claims have been.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS: CULTURAL CHANGE AND COPYRIGHT
Judge McKeown identifies significant cultural shifts in the public view
of copyright, with increased public concern about its possibly censorious
uses.65 But, culture needed to change to catch up to the massive expansion
of copyright law over the past few decades, both in terms of how people
experience copyrighted works in ways that increasingly implicate statutory
rights and in terms of what counts as infringement. As Professor Jessica
Litman has cogently explained, when copyright rights get bigger, exceptions
to those rights, including fair use, should also get bigger in order to preserve
the same general structural relationship of free speech to privately owned
speech.66 A mansion with only the same number of windows as a one-story

63. In the 9th Circuit, though not elsewhere, state law right of publicity claims are also preempted
in furtherance of § 230’s goal of national uniformity. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1125 (9th Cir. 2003).
64. See Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1175–81 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that use of
football players’ likenesses in video game was not protected against right of publicity claims by the First
Amendment).
65. McKeown, supra note 1, at 15.
66. Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 652–84 (2015).
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cottage would be awfully dark. The same can be said for fair use, an
important bringer of light to culture.

